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Abstract
Background: The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was introduced in Ghana to ensure equity in
healthcare access. Presently, some low and middle income countries including Ghana are using social health
insurance schemes to reduce inequity in access to healthcare. In Ghana, the NHIS was introduced to address the
problem of inequity in healthcare access in a period that was characterised by user-fee regimes. The premium is
heavily subsidised and exemption provided for the poorest, yet studies reveal that they are least enrolled in the
scheme. We used a multi-level perspective as conceptual and methodological tool to examine why the NHIS is not
reaching the poor as envisaged.
Methods: Fifteen communities in the Central and Eastern Regions of Ghana were surveyed after implementing a
20 months intervention programme aimed at ensuring that community members have adequate knowledge of the
NHIS’ principles and benefits and improve enrolment and retention rates. Observation and in-depth interviews were
used to gather information about the effects of the intervention in seven selected communities, health facilities and
District Health Insurance Schemes in the Central Region.
Results: The results showed a distinct rise in the NHIS’ enrolment among the general population but the poor
were less covered. Of the 6790 individuals covered in the survey, less than half (40.3 %) of the population were
currently insured in the NHIS and 22.4 % were previously insured. The poorest had the lowest enrolment rate:
poorest 17.6 %, poor 31.3 %, rich 46.4 % and richest 44.4 % (p = 0.000). Previous enrolment rates were: poorest
(15.4 %) and richest (23.8 %), (p = 0.000). Ironically, the poor’s low enrolment was widely attributed to their poverty.
The underlying structural cause, however, was policy makers’ and implementers’ lack of commitment to pursue
NHIS’ equity goal.
Conclusion: Inequity in healthcare access persists because of the social and institutional environment in which the
NHIS operates. There is a need to effectively engage stakeholders to develop interventions to ensure that the poor
are included in the NHIS.
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Résumé
Contexte: Le régime national d’assurance maladie (NHIS) a été introduit au Ghana pour assurer l’équité dans l’accès
aux soins de santé. Actuellement, certains pays à faible revenu et intermédiaire, dont le Ghana, utilisent des
Régimes sociaux d’Assurance-Santé pour réduire les inégalités dans l’accès aux soins. Au Ghana, le NHIS a été
introduit pour résoudre le problème de l’inégalité dans l’accès aux soins pendant une période marquée par des
régimes de frais d'utilisation. La prime a été fortement subventionnée et des exemptions prévues pour les plus
pauvres. Néanmoins, des études révèlent qu’ils sont moins couverts dans le programme. Nous avons utilisé une
perspective à multi-niveaux comme outil conceptuel et méthodologique pour examiner pourquoi le NHIS ne
bénéficie pas les pauvres.
Méthodes: Quinze communautés des régions Est et Centrale du Ghana ont été interrogées après la mise en œuvre
d’un programme d’intervention de 20 mois visant à assurer que les communautés aient une connaissance
suffisante des principes et prestations d’assurance-santé et à augmenter l’inscription et le taux de rétention au NHIS.
Observation et entrevues détaillées ont été employées pour recueillir des informations sur les effets de
l’intervention dans sept communautés sélectionnées dans la Région centrale.
Résultats: Les résultats font preuve d’une nette augmentation de l’inscription à l’assurance-santé dans la
population générale, mais les pauvres sont moins couverts. Des 6.790 personnes interrogées, moins de la moitié
(40.3 %) étaient actuellement couverte dans le NHIS et 22.4 % ont été préalablement assurées. Les plus pauvres
étaient les moins inscrits : 17.6 % plus pauvres, 31.3 % pauvres, 46.4 % riches et 44.4 % plus riches (p = 0.000). Les
taux d’inscription préalables étaient de 15.4 % plus pauvres et 23.8 % plus riches (p = 0.000). Paradoxalement, la
faible inscription des pauvres a été largement attribuée à leur pauvreté. La cause structurelle sous-jacente,
cependant, était le manque d’engagement des décideurs et exécutants de politique à poursuivre l’objectif du NHIS
qui est celui de l’équité.
Conclusion: L’inégalité dans l’accès aux soins de santé persiste en raison de l’environnement social et institutionnel
dans lequel le NHIS opère. Il est nécessaire d’engager les parties prenantes pour développer des interventions et
assurer que les pauvres sont inclus dans le NHIS.
Mots clés: Assurance maladie, Inscription, Rétention, Pauvreté, Exemption, Equité
Background
Inequity in healthcare access has been of grave concern
to health system analysts and researchers everywhere.
They argued that since user fees denied many people ac-
cess to quality healthcare [1–7], equity could only be
achieved through financial risk pooling [7]. The World
Health Organisation (WHO) posit that pre-payment
mechanisms are critical to improving access, ensure
equity and quality of care in developing countries [7].
Policy makers often assume that social health insurance
schemes (SHISs) would almost automatically lead to
equity. But on what evidence was this argument
advanced?
Presently, some low and middle income countries in-
cluding Ghana, Tanzania and Taiwan are using SHISs to
reduce inequity in access to healthcare. In Ghana, the
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was intro-
duced to address the problem of inequity in healthcare
access in a period that was characterised by user-fee1 re-
gimes. The premium is heavily subsidised and exemption
provided for the poorest. The NHIS is therefore ex-
pected to reach the poorest first but studies show that
alongside its success story of improving healthcare ac-
cess and helping achieve better health outcomes [8–10],
the poor are less covered in the scheme [11, 12]. In-
depth knowledge about why the NHIS is falling short of
its equity goal has not been thoroughly investigated.
This article is based on a follow-up survey carried out in
15 intervention communities in March 2011 in the
Central Region (CR) and Eastern Region (ER) of Ghana.
In addition, key informant interviews and observation
were carried out in two out of seven communities in the
CR. The conclusions that are drawn in this article are
not based on only survey results, observation and dis-
cussions with key informants, but also insights acquired
through close reading of academic publications, policy
reports and popular press.
The novel feature of this study is the engagement of
local stakeholders who are critical in NHIS’ policy im-
plementation in discussions and the focus on events at
various levels. This ensured that all possible dynamics
that leads to the core poor’s low enrolment in the
scheme was captured and a more credible explanation
why the NHIS is not reaching them as intended is
provided.
The results of this critical analysis of pathways of ex-
cluding the core poor from the NHIS in the midst of ex-
emption will generate public interest in the ongoing
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debate about whether the poor are adequately included
in the scheme. It will also inform the design of interven-
tions on how to improve equity in the NHIS.
Evolution of national health insurance in Ghana
Since Ghana attained self-rule in 1952, various health fi-
nancing policies from fee-free2, user-fees to health insur-
ance have been introduced with the goal of ensuring
equity in access to quality healthcare. Fee-free healthcare
was introduced in all public health facilities as part of
President Nkrumah’s socialist development agenda to
ensure that all Ghanaians have access to quality health-
care. Sustaining the policy became a challenge during
the economic decline in the 1960s, the Hospital Fees
Regulation, which introduced user-fees, was passed in
1963 (Legislative Instrument (LI) 1277). After President
Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966, the National Liberation
Council enacted the Hospital Fee Decree 360 in 1969 to
raise user-fees. The fees charged were heavily subsidised
and so healthcare was described as virtually free [13].
Decline in the economy in the late 1970s and 1980s led
to heavy cuts in budget allocations to the health sector;
resulting in consistent shortfall in drugs, inadequate
equipment and other consumables in public health facil-
ities [14, 15].
The government of the Provisional National Defence
Council (PNDC) addressed these inadequacies by re-
placing LI 1277 with LI 1313 in 1985 [16] and intro-
duced pay-per-service model, ‘cash and carry’3, in order
to recover 15 % of recurrent expenditure and full-cost of
drugs. Studies reported drops in utilisation ranging from
25 % to 90 %, with the greatest decline among the poor
[2, 4–6, 17]. As expected, the reaction to the revelation
that user-fees denied many Ghanaians especially the
poor access to quality healthcare services was so strong
that an alternative health financing policy was impera-
tive. The PNDC thus contracted local and international
experts to make recommendations for the establishment
of a national health insurance scheme. This culminated
in the launch of a pilot NHIS by the National Demo-
cratic Congress (NDC) government in four districts in
the ER (New Juabeng, Birim South, Kwawu South and
Suhum Kraboah Coaltar) in 1997. These schemes stalled
but ignited debates on the need to replace user-fees with
health insurance. This led to the creation of community-
based health insurance schemes (CBHISs) by religious
groups and local government administrations. The suc-
cess of many of the CBHISs [18] and the continuous
pressure by local and international institutions to estab-
lish a national health insurance inspired the government
to commission the Social Security and National Insur-
ance Trust (SSNIT)4 to plan another centralised health
insurance scheme. But this vision could not materialise
due to a change in government.
The New Patriotic Party (NPP) then in opposition
made a commitment in their manifesto for the 2000
election to implement a national health insurance. Upon
winning the election and assuming office on January 7
2001, set up a Ministerial Health Financing Task Force
to provide advice on how to develop appropriate health
insurance legislation and financing mechanism. After a
troubled start they came out with recommendations
which led to the passage of a new National Health Insur-
ance (NHI) Law (Act 650) under a certificate of urgency
in 2003 [19, 20]. The NHIS became operational in
March 2004 with the goal of replacing cash and carry,
ensure equitable and universal access to a good quality
healthcare within five years. The NHI Act specifies a
minimum package that covers 95 % of diseases reported
in health facilities in Ghana and requires no co-payment.
Since the NHIS is intended to be pro-poor, a National
Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) was established to sub-
sidise the premium of informal sector workers and pay
premium for vulnerable groups including indigents re-
ferred to in this paper as ‘poorest’ or ‘core poor’, children
below 18 years, SSNIT pensioners and non-SSNIT pen-
sioners’ 70 years and above. Pregnant women were
added to the exemption group in June 2008. The NHIF
was financed through money allocated by Parliament,
2.5 % of the SSNIT contributions, 2.5 % value added tax
on selected goods and services and the government’s an-
nual budgetary allocation to the NHIA. Studies have re-
ported that NHIS’ improved access to healthcare [9, 10].
Durairaj and others reported that the NHIS provides so-
cial and financial protection to insured patients and con-
tributes to a decline in hospital deaths among the
insured due to early treatment [9].
Theoretical orientation of the study
This study, the anthropological component of a multidis-
ciplinary research project, examines why the NHIS is not
reaching the poor as envisaged. It is situated within critical
medical anthropology which emphasises that researchers
have academic and moral obligation to reveal and address
the broad socio-economic, cultural and political contexts
in which health inequities occur [21–23]. Other re-
searchers added that health policy decisions should con-
sider what happens at local levels in order to capture the
perspectives of the targets of the policy [24, 25]. These au-
thors proposed the use of a ‘multi-level perspective’
(MLP) in the study of health issues. The MLP emphasises
that to understand a social phenomenon, information
should be gathered from actors and events at various
levels of social organisation. This means researchers
should consider the wider context in analysing health
issues and focus on different actors and associated
events at various levels instead of concentrating on
one level or actor. Van der Geest and others
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advocated the use of the MLP in the study of health
policies to enable researchers capture the views of
people most affected by those policies [24].
The word ‘level’ is used as a metaphor to refer to
international, national, regional and local tiers of social
organisation. The authors argue that events and actors’
varied interest at these levels interact to affect a social
phenomenon. So researchers who confine their work to
one level and or actor and ignore what happens at other
levels gained limited information. They miss what hap-
pens at these levels which may be of crucial relevance to
what takes place at the level they focus on. They applied
the MLP to examine why Primary Health Care (PHC)
did not work in many countries as intended. They
showed how governments, health professionals and
community members had conflicting interests in the
PHC. Governments were interested in the PHC because
it provides cheap healthcare services and advance their
political interest. Health professionals disliked PHC be-
cause of a lack of financial opportunities. Local people
on their part, perceived the PHC as second-rate health-
care. The authors thus provided a comprehensive ex-
planation why PHC’s goal of providing health for all by
the year 2000 was not achieved and many countries still
have poor health indicators. Similarly, we argue that
stakeholders’ behaviour and interest often conflict with
the NHIS’ policy goals and make it difficult to achieve
its equity goal. The MLP thus provides the appropriate
conceptual framework to conceptualise the NHIS as a
health financing policy that involves various actors (poli-
ticians, policy makers, implementers and community
members) at different levels of the health system [24].
The use of the MLP as a conceptual framework was
based on the assumption that the NHIS was introduced
as a social protection initiative whose success depends
on the behaviour, interest and commitment of policy
makers, implementers and consumers of healthcare.
Linking local events and practices to national level ideas
pointing out conflicting interests that account for what
happens, is the key objective of the MLP that was
adopted in the project.
The MLP is also used as a methodological tool to en-
gage local actors to explore factors that undermine the
achievement of NHIS’s equity goal. This is grounded on
the argument that when key stakeholders at different
levels are engaged in studying a social phenomenon, in
this case low enrolment of the core poor in the NHIS,
its different dimensions is captured.
Methods
Study design and setting
This article is an analytic reflection on a large research
project, about health insurance enrolment and member-
ship renewal in Southern Ghana. The results of a
baseline survey carried out in one randomly selected
communities in each of the 30 districts with DHIS of-
fices in both regions were used to form 15 intervention
groups (7 in CR and 8 in ER) and 15 control (6 in CR
and 9 in CR). The two regions were strategically chosen
to represent the ecology (forest and coastal) and the
main economic activities (farming and fishing) of South-
ern Ghana. They also have similar poverty incidence:
0.40 and 0.45 respectively [26].
We established a multi-stakeholder problem-solving
programme (MSPSP) in the 15 studied communities.
The MSPSP set up problem-solving groups (PSGs). The
PSGs carried out educational and promotional activities
and ensured all residents have adequate knowledge
about NHIS’ operational principles and benefit package.
The PSG members were selected from the health ser-
vices, the DHIS and the community.
The intervention communities were exposed to 20-
monthly awareness-raising campaign on the operational
guidelines of the NHIS and benefits of health insurance
through ‘PSG discussion groups’ at community level.
The groups met every month to discuss the obstacles to
enrolment and how to improve the effectiveness of
health insurance with the goal of improving NHIS enrol-
ment and retention rates (see Kotoh for detailed descrip-
tion of PSGs’ formation and activities) [27].
Data collection and analysis
Quantitative data was obtained from the follow-up sur-
vey carried out in the 15 intervention communities using
structured questionnaire administered to randomly se-
lected heads of households who provided information
on all their members. The data includes individual
health insurance status and socio-economic status (SES).
Health insurance status was categorised into three: (1)
currently insured (the population that have valid NHIS
cards), (2) previously insured (the population that have
not renewed their membership and (3) never insured
(the population that have never enrolled in the scheme).
Poverty was estimated using households’ detailed
monthly consumption expenditures on food and non-
food items including imputed values for items produced
by the households such as food and housing to have uni-
formity with the 2005 Ghana Living Standard Survey
(GLSS V) data. The GLSS V is an internationally ac-
cepted method for estimating household income in de-
veloping countries [25]. The households were ranked
into five socio-economic categories: core poor, poor,
average, rich and very rich. Calculation of the SES was
done by the health economists in the project team and
reported elsewhere [28, 29]. All analysis were done in
SPSS version 20.
The anthropological-qualitative research was carried
out in the seven intervention communities in the CR
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from June to September 2011 to complement and fur-
ther explore the quantitative results. Two communities
out of these seven received extra attention through con-
tinuous participant observation and in-depth interviews
by the first author using a purposeful sample that is rep-
resentative of the three local stakeholders. Forty key in-
formants; 20 from each study site (11 community
members, 7 health providers and 2 DHIS staff ) were
purposely selected (Table 1).
Community members were selected a few weeks into the
fieldwork based on their representativeness of the target
population: being 18 years and above, currently insured,
previously insured and never insured as well as poor and
rich individuals. Key informants who were health providers
or DHIS staff were purposely selected based on their work
schedule and insight into the NHIS’ operations.
The methodological features of indepth interview and
observation make them extremely useful in policy re-
search. It has the advantage of providing non-linguistic
data. By entering into a direct dialogue with stakeholders
the researcher observes their body language and ges-
tures, ask further questions and probes for additional in-
formation to gain more insight into perspectives,
experiences and practices to confirm the findings. For
instance, observing the countenance of the DHIS staff
during interviews provided additional information to
support what others had said about the reasons why the
care poor were less covered in the NHIS.
The qualitative data was analysed manually. First, obser-
vation and conversation notes were elaborated into field
note books at the end of each day. Interviews were digit-
ally recorded and transcribed verbatim. The transcript and
observation notes were read several times to get a sense of
the entire data. Second, the test was subjected to a
qualitative content analysis to generate common themes
emanating from the data [30]. Third, typical comments by
the three categories of participants (community members,
health providers and DHIS staff) were abridged into
meaningful summary statements and further condensed
to form themes. The themes were: local conditions of the
poor, implementation of the exemption, reasons for not
granting exemption and stakeholders’ interest in the
NHIS. The summary statements were categorised and
placed under the column created for community mem-
bers, health providers and DHIS staff and put below each
theme. Fourth, the second author critically reviewed the
transcription and the analysis. After this, we met and dis-
cussed the entire results to ensure that the themes and
summary statements reflect participants’ views. The text
was referred to when a deeper understanding of an issue
and the quantitative results was needed in discussing the
results. Finally, we place the findings in the wider context
of national politics and administrative practices, linked
local events to the national level ideas and practices and
pointed out stakeholders’ conflicting interests that contrib-
uted to the poor’s low coverage in the NHIS.
The Ghana Health Service Ethic Committee approved
the research protocol. The consent form stated the aim
of the study, participants’ right to decline to participate
or opt out at any time. Participants’ confidentiality was
guaranteed by not sharing their personal information
with any other person.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics of households and individuals
covered by the survey
The quantitative data covered 1562 households and 6790
individuals. Almost half (46.3 %) of individuals were below
Table 1 Profile of key informants in each case study community
Stakeholders Position/employment Number
Community members Fishermen or farmers, 3
Traders, farmers, unemployed 3
Traditional and opinion leaders 3
Religious leaders 2
Health facility staff Staff nurse 1




District health Directorate staff Disease control officer 1
District director of health 1
District Health Insurance Scheme staff Public Relations Officer 1
Manager 1
Total 20
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18 years and 4 % aged 70 years and above. A little over half
(52.5 %) were females. About 20.5 % of the population
belonged to the poorest socio-economic quintiles (Table 2).
The findings show that the poor are less covered in the
NHIS. Of the 6790 individuals covered in the follow-up
survey in intervention communities, less than half
(40.3 %) were currently insured and 22.4 % were previ-
ously insured and 37 % had never enrolled. There were
notable differences in NHIS status across socio-economic
categories with the poorest being the least covered:
poorest 17.6 %, poor 31.3 %, rich 46.4 % and richest
44.4 % (p = 0.000). However, previous enrolment rate was
higher among the richest: rich (23.7 %), richest (23.8 %)
and poor (18.4 %), poorest (15.4 %) (p = 0.000) (Table 3).
This means that more poor renew their membership regu-
larly compared to the rich. Critical analysis of the qualita-
tive data brought to the fore two main factors: poverty
and policy makers’ and implementers’ lack of commitment
to the NHIS’s equity agenda.
Poverty and enrolment in Ghana’s National Health
Insurance Scheme
Equity in coverage is at the heart of the NHIS’ policy.
Yet our findings show that the poor are less covered in
the scheme. The lower enrolment among the poor sup-
ports previous studies that enrolment in the NHIS in-
creases with income [11, 12]. In their study in a rural
district of Southern Ghana, Sarpong and others found
that 38 % of households surveyed were currently en-
rolled in the NHIS. Of this, 21 %, 43 % and 60 % were of
poor, middle and high SES households respectively [12].
Our results show that poverty affects enrolment but is
less significant in membership renewal. Thus the poor
when enrolled were more likely to remain in the scheme.
This suggests that the poor value health insurance more
than the rich. The question then is: why is the poor the
least enrolled in the NHIS? Our results and evidence
from earlier studies indicate that many healthcare inter-
ventions, targeted at the poor, do not often reach them
as planned is overwhelming [31–37].
When community members who were considered to
be core poor by local standards were asked why they
had not enrolled in the NHIS or had not renewed their
membership, poverty, “No money to pay premium”, was
most frequently mentioned. A community leader sum-
marised the situation of the core poor as follows: “They
are very poor individuals who have no stable source of
income. They struggle to get one meal a day and cannot
afford the cost of premium.”
A health provider also described the situation as
follows:
The good thing about the NHIS is that the insured pa-
tients are coming to the hospital early with less compli-
cated cases. But people who are very poor come to the
hospital without insurance and can’t pay their bills so we
refer them to the DHIS for exemption to enable us get
our money.
Lack of commitment to achieve equity in health
insurance coverage
Our results brought to the fore the underlying, less
understood causes of the NHIS’s failure to achieve one
of its primary objectives: protecting Ghana’s most vul-
nerable citizens (the core poor) against the disastrous
consequences of ill health. Though policy makers’ clearly
stated their commitment to bring about equity in health-
care access within five years of NHIS’ introduction
through exemptions almost a decade into its operations,
the core poor were the least enrolled. The exemption is
not reaching them, thus contradicting policy makers’
claim that the NHIS would bring about equity in health-
care access within five years.
First, critical analysis of the criteria for exemption
show that one of the conditions policy makers set for
granting exemption to the core poor does not reflect
local conditions of poverty. The following are the criteria
stipulated in the National Health Insurance Regulations
2004, LI 1809:58 for identifying the core poor:
Table 2 Background characteristics of households and
individuals covered in the survey
Overall (all household members) N = 6790 Percentages




Sex n = 6790
Male 47.5
Female 52.5
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1. A person shall not be classified as an indigent under
a district scheme unless that person
a. is unemployed and has no visible source of
income;
b. does not have a fixed place of residence according
to standards determined by the DHIS;
c. does not live with a person who is employed and
who has a fixed place of residence;
d. does not have any identifiable consistent support
from another person.
2. The conditions under sub-regulation (1) for ascer-
taining who is an indigent shall be incorporated in
the registration form of a district scheme.
3. A person assigned the duty by a district scheme of
registering persons for the scheme, shall elicit the
information required under the sub regulation (1)
for the classification of indigents as part of the
registration process.
4. Every district scheme shall keep and publish a list of
indigents in its area of operation and submit the list
to the NHIA for validation [38].
Though all these criteria are restrictive, the 1b criter-
ion which DHISs referred to as homelessness, defined as
lacking a roof and not having any one to provide care, to
qualify the core poor for premium exemption [39], dis-
qualifies almost everybody. The reality is that homeless-
ness is nearly non-existent in the districts. The core
poor are described as persons afflicted with ‘ohia
buburoo’ (abject poverty) who do not have a stable
source of income to enrol their household members and
renew their membership regularly. In farming communi-
ties, a number of them were engaged as labourers by
farmers to sow and harvest crops. They were also en-
gaged by boat owners during the bumper harvest in fish-
ing communities. Some did menial jobs and did not
have a stable income while others were totally un-
employed and usually lived on the occasional benevo-
lence of family members or friends. The core poor
normally live in family houses, with friends or in dilapi-
dated houses. Apart from the cities, homelessness does
not exist. I did not find a normal homeless person in the
15 communities I visited during my fieldwork. Every-
body including the core poor had a home. Homelessness
is mostly a characteristic of mentally disturbed people
who roam cities and towns. In her study of community
concepts of poverty in the CR of Ghana, Aryeetey and
her colleagues also observed that homelessness is an in-
appropriate condition for granting exemption to the
poor [28, 40]. As has been observed, the effectiveness of
SHISs is the ability to reduce genuine exclusion [41]. We
therefore question the motive for setting a criterion
which disqualifies almost all potential beneficiaries as
the basis for granting the core poor exemption.
The relevant questions are: If the poor are the primary
target of the NHIS, why set a criterion that excludes
them? Whose definition of the core poor should count:
the one by policy makers or the one by the community?
Analysis of these questions reveals insights regarding the
motivation to establish a criterion that eliminates poten-
tial beneficiaries: lack of commitment. If policy makers
were genuinely committed to exempting the core poor,
they would have ensured that all the criteria reflect the
conditions of the target group and guide collectors on
how to register them. Why these actions were not taken
is explained by looking at the political situation at the
time that the NHIS was introduced and taking into ac-
count the financial implications of granting exemptions
to all those who would qualify. Enrolling all the exempt
categories would have depleted the country’s budget so
they needed a definition that would drastically reduce
the financial burden without changing the election
slogans.
At the time the policy was introduced and even now
the NHIS has a large exemption group (more than half
of Ghana’s population). The 2003 Ghana Demographic
Health Survey reported that 44 % of Ghana’s population
was below 15 years [42]. The 2000 Population Census
showed that 5.3 % were above 64 years [43]. The 2010
Population and Housing Census also showed that 30.3 %
and 4.7 % of the population were under 15 years and
65 years and above respectively [44]. These nation-wide
figures roughly agree with our 2011 survey results which
show that children (0-17 years) form 48.1 % of the
Table 3 Health insurance status by socio-economic quintiles
N = 6790 Currently insured P-value Previously insured P-value
Overall 40.3 22.4
Socio-economic categories N = 6790
Poorest 20.5 17.6 0.000 15.4 0.000
Poor 20.1 31.3 18.4
Average 19.7 35.0 22.1
Rich 20.6 46.4 23.7
Richest 19.1 44.4 23.8
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population and 3.4 % was above 70 years. In the case of
the core poor, the Ghana Living Standard Survey shows
that about a third (28.5 %) of Ghana’s population lived
below the poverty line [26]. Considering the core poor
alone, it means that the government would have to pay
premiums for about 2.5 million people. This equals a
total cost of about GH 35 million (US$25 million) per
annum, which would be a significant demand on the
country’s budget. For a country already overstretched
with unfulfilled needs in other sectors, such as education
and roads, the money to cover all these exemptions was
simply not available. The NHIA debt to health facilities
is an indication of the huge financial burden of exemp-
tions on the country’s limited financial resources. By the
end of 2008, the NHIA owed health facilities about
US$34 million [36].
The NHIS was introduced nation-wide in March 2004
and elections were held in December of the same year.
The homelessness criterion thus seemed a strategy to
lessen the financial burden of enrolling all core poor
while serving as propaganda to accumulate political cap-
ital for the pending election. There was nothing to lose
if in practice the homelessness criterion eliminated al-
most all potential beneficiaries while appearing to be ful-
filling the government’s moral obligation to the poor and
also showed the international community they were
committed to ensuring the poor have access to health-
care. Also, the NHIS policy-making process was charac-
terised by political rhetoric [19, 45]. What was
important at that time was to win votes and not practi-
calities of implementing the exemption policy. If this
had not been the case, and politicians were truly com-
mitted they could have ensured that all the criteria set
reflect the reality of the core poor. Poverty needs to be
defined by the community. This view starts from the as-
sumption that opinion and community leaders under-
stand local conditions of poverty and are in a better
position to devise effective guidelines that could be used
to identify them. A critical analysis of various methods
of identifying poor households, concluded that the com-
munity criteria of classifying the poorest members corre-
lated with mean testing and the proxy mean testing
considered as the gold standard [28]. One can hardly
reach another conclusion than that the realities of imple-
menting the exemption policy for the poor was
intentionally disregarded. As pointed out: “A policy is
only as good as its implementation arrangement.” [46].
First, policy makers recognised that no matter how
low the cost of premium, the core poor cannot pay so
provided exemption to ensure their inclusion in the
NHIS. But the exemption is not reaching them.
When DHIS staff and collectors were asked why they
did not enrol the core poor, they demonstrated lack of
commitment to the equity goal when discussing the
issue.. Their first response was normally the problem of
identification. A DHIS staff explained why they hardly
exempt the core poor from paying premium as follows:
“The main criterion we use is homelessness which dis-
qualifies almost everybody. But we occasionally give ex-
emptions when health providers refer patients who
cannot pay their hospital bill to us.” Critical observation
of their countenance and further discussions with them
revealed that it is not the problem of identification but
their answer was often a convenient and morally accept-
able excuse. Thus just like previous exemption policies
which were not successful, only a few core poor benefit
from exemptions under the NHIS. The core poor are
unable to claim the exemption they are entitled to. How
is this possible?
Contrary to the general opinion that inadequate ex-
emption for the core poor is mainly due to identification
difficulties, we argue that the explanation runs deeper.
The DHIISs could have used local indicators of poverty
such as unemployment, no visible source of income and
consistent support from another person which share
commonalities with what is stated in the NHIS policy
(1a and 1d). Ignoring these community indicators of
poverty and using homelessness as the decisive criterion
proved a convenient tool to exclude nearly all core poor
without seeming unreasonable.
Also, it was observed that DHISs’ often undertake rev-
enue generation activities but virtually do nothing to
identify the core poor for exemption. Throughout my
fieldwork I did not see the DHISs organising any activity
to identify the core poor for premium exemptions. The
following comment by a DHIS staff illustrates their atti-
tude towards exemptions for the core poor: We need
money so if we go to communities and tell them about
exemption for the core poor, how do we get revenue to
meet some of our expenditure?
Additionally, collectors who were expected to recom-
mend the core poor to the DHISs to be certified as
qualified for exemption usually do not disseminate infor-
mation about exemptions. They focus mainly on pre-
mium collection. One of them said: “I am not paid for
enrolling those who do not pay premium. So if I continue
registering them how do I get money for the work I’m
doing.” These comments and similar others show clearly
that collectors’ attitude may have to do with the fact that
they were not paid for registering the ‘exempt group’.
This practice defeats the purpose of the NHIS as a safety
net, which is expected to provide the poor with access to
healthcare when ill and not when they are unable to pay
for their healthcare. One can thus conclude that DHISs’
staff ’s decision not to pursue NHIS’ equity agenda was
often based on the financial implications of exemptions
for their offices. The premium contributes significantly
to their internally generated fund (IGF) which they need
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to meet some of their recurrent expenditure. The IGF is
also used to judge the performance of DHISs. These cre-
ated disincentives to exempt people especially the core
poor whose endorsement solely depends on the staff.
Further, many community members told me they were
not even aware of the exemption policy. This supports
an earlier study on exemption across 18 communities in
the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions of
Ghana also found that 61 % of their respondents did not
know about exemptions for the poor [37]. A study found
that exemptions for indigents (core poor) under Ghana’s
NHIS were 1 % in 2008 [36]. In their study on exemp-
tions of Community Health Fund in Tanzania observed
that the managers often refuse request for exemptions
because they felt it reduces their revenue [34].
These observations clearly indicate lack of interest
from the DHIS staff and collectors to pursue NHIS’s
equity agenda. Thus NHIS’ purpose as a safety net,
which is expected to ensure equity in healthcare access,
is not achieving its objective. Thus macro-level policies
targeted at the poor often fail to achieve their objectives
because of implementers’ attitudes.
We draw on Lipsky’s concept of street-level bureaucrats’
to explain the gap between the exemption policy and im-
plementation. In his analysis of frontline public service
workers’ behaviour in the United States of America [47].
He observes that they generally display a high margin of
discretion and their actions effectively become public policy
rather than the objectives of the documents developed at
the policy level. Similarly, in this study DHIS staff and col-
lectors can be described as stress-level bureaucrats who
used their discretion and decide which aspects of the NHIS
policy needs to be pursued: revenue generation or exemp-
tion. As has been pointed out by earlier researchers, there
should be trade-offs to achieve both goals [48]. We found
that DHISs’ staff and collectors, who are to pursue both
goals, have gradually shifted their focus in favour of revenue
generation. They were more concerned about increasing
their IGF to enhance their image and not to vigorously look
for people to exempt since giving exemptions means they
lose revenue.
The argument that policy makers and implementers are
not committed to pursuing the NHIS’ equity agenda is
strengthened when one considers the fact that the non-
applicability of the homelessness criterion has been dis-
cussed in the public domain since the NHIS was intro-
duced, yet no solution is in sight. This is not to say that
nothing is being done to improve the applicability of the
exemption policy, but the moral urgency required of both
past and present governments seems to be lacking.
The amended NHI Law, Act 852 section 29 (d) states
that ‘a person classified by the Minister responsible for
Social Welfare as an indigent (core poor), qualifies for
exemption and are enrolled in the NHIS [49]. With this,
the NHIA depends on the Livelihood Empowerment
against Poverty (LEAP)5 Programme to identify the core
poor. The LEAP started in March 2008 by the Govern-
ment of Ghana as a social cash transfer programme to
vulnerable households across the country. It is still in its
trial phase and has reached only 35,000 individuals [50].
Eligibility is based on poverty and having a household
member in at least one of these three demographic cat-
egories: single parent with orphan or vulnerable child,
elderly poor, or person with extreme disability and un-
able to work. Initial selection of households is done
through a community-based process and verified cen-
trally with a proxy means test. It must be noted that
none of the core poor covered by the project in inter-
vention communities in March 2011, benefited from the
LEAP programme. This suggest that despite the im-
provement in the exemption criteria, it still does not ad-
equately resolve the problem of excluding the poor from
the scheme. Thus the LEAP though laudable in its
current form seem not to be the panacea to the exclu-
sion of majority of the poor in the NHIS.
These reflections clearly show that even if the imple-
mentation arena is littered with other barriers, policy
makers’ professed goal of ensuring equity in healthcare
access is not being given the urgency it requires to en-
sure all core poor are included in the NHIS.
Limitation of the study
Since the study was conducted in only two regions in
Southern Ghana, the NHIS’ implementation contest and
dynamics might not be exactly the same in the rest of the
country. Notwithstanding this limitation, we believe the
inclusion of events at the national level make our findings
reflect the enrolment of the poor in the NHIS and the rea-
sons for their low coverage in the whole of Ghana. That
said, the conclusions should be interpreted with care.
Conclusion
This study has shown that though the NHIS is a social
security programme targeted at the poor, the socio-
economic and political context in which it operates ex-
clude them from the scheme. After almost ten years into
its operations, mere 18 % core poor in the sampled
population have a valid NHIS card even though they
value health insurance. We recommend that community
leaders should be engaged to develop criteria that reflect
local conditions of poverty. They understand local con-
ditions of poverty and are in a better position to devise
effective guidelines for identifying the poorest members
instead of policy makers who might not be familiar with
local situations.
Our results show that financial implications of exemp-
tions to DHISs and collectors contribute to exclusion of
the core poor from the NHIS. Since the economic cost
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of prolonged illness does not affect the individual but
also the country’s development, we therefore suggest
that politicians and policy makers should be conscien-
tised to appreciate that it is economically prudent to
provide DHISs adequate funds to reduce their reliance
on the IGF and pay collectors for enroling the core poor
to motivate them to pursue the NHIS’s equity agenda.
Moreover, the majority of the core poor are excluded
from the NHIS essentially because they could not de-
mand exemption provided them. They are the silent
ones in society who cannot challenge policy makers and
DHISs for not granting them exemptions for which they
qualify. We thus suggest that the powerful in society
such as researchers and civil society organisations should
advocate for them, point out the gaps in the exemption
policy and project how the interest of politicians, DHISs’
and collectors undermines the attainment of NHIS’
equity goal. This will put pressure on the government to
develop appropriate exemption implementation strat-
egies to ensure the poorest of Ghana’s population, the
main target of the NHIS, are covered.
Endnotes
1User-fees refer to out-of-pocket payments for some
healthcare services at the point of utilisation.
2Fee-free refers to free access to healthcare for all resi-
dents in Ghana at public facilities.
3Cash and carry was a WHO and UNICEF initiative
adopted by African Health Ministers in Bamako, Mali, in
1987. The policy aimed at improving drug supplies in
public health facilities and led to out-of-pocket payment
for full cost of drugs in public health facilities.
4The Social Security and National Insurance Trust
(SSNIT) is a government pension scheme in Ghana that
most formal sector workers and their employers contrib-
ute to.
5The Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty
(LEAP) Programme started in March 2008 and ex-
panded in 2009 and 2010 as a social cash transfer
programme which provides cash and health insurance to
extremely poor households across Ghana. It is funded by
the Government of Ghana (50 %), donations from the
Department for International Development and a loan
from the World Bank and implemented by the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Gender, Chil-
dren and Social Protection.
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